ORGANIZATIONAL DISECONOMIES OF SCALE

被引:106
作者
MCAFEE, RP [1 ]
MCMILLAN, J [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO,GRAD SCH INT RELAT & PACIFIC STUDIES,LA JOLLA,CA 92093
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00399.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Private information creates a cost of operating a hierarchy, which becomes larger as the hierarchical distance between the information source and the decision maker increases. When information about a firm's capabilities is dispersed among the individuals in the firm, production is inefficient even though everyone behaves rationally. Because hierarchies need rents in order to function, a firm with a long hierarchy may not be viable in a competitive industry.
引用
收藏
页码:399 / 426
页数:28
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