MANIPULATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE MECHANISMS THAT DO NOT LEAVE TOO MUCH TO CHANCE

被引：74

作者：

BARBERA, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV AUTONOMA MADRID,MADRID 34,SPAIN

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1913950

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1573 / 1588

页数：16

共 10 条

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[5] GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREMS FOR GROUP DECISIONS [J].

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[8] VOTING SYSTEMS, HONEST PREFERENCES AND PARETO OPTIMALITY [J].

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[9]

[No title captured]

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