DEADLINE EFFECTS AND INEFFICIENT DELAY IN BARGAINING WITH ENDOGENOUS COMMITMENT

被引：67

作者：

FERSHTMAN, C ^{[1
]}

SEIDMANN, DJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE,DEPT ECON,NEWCASTLE TYNE NE1 7RU,TYNE & WEAR,ENGLAND

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1993年 / 60卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1993.1045

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Bilateral (sequential) negotiators delay agreements until a deadline if a player that rejects an offer is subsequently committed not to accept any poorer proposal, and if the common discount factor is close enough to one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C78, J52. © 1993 by Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：306 / 321

页数：16

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