VERTICAL VS HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION - PREEMPTIVE MERGING

被引:21
作者
COLANGELO, G
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2950583
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Pre-emption often plays a crucial role in firms' merger decisions. We study whether and under which circumstances pre-emptive merging occurs in vertically related industries. We find that vertical mergers often pre-empt horizontal mergers and are dominant outcomes. Pre-empting the threat of a detrimental horizontal integration may be the main reason for vertically integrating.
引用
收藏
页码:323 / 337
页数:15
相关论文
共 9 条
[1]   INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS, VERTICAL INTEGRATION, AND SUPPLY ASSURANCE [J].
BOLTON, P ;
WHINSTON, MD .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1993, 60 (01) :121-148
[2]  
COLANGELO G, 1993, THESIS U LONDON
[3]   INCENTIVES TO FORM COALITIONS WITH BERTRAND COMPETITION [J].
DENECKERE, R ;
DAVIDSON, C .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1985, 16 (04) :473-486
[4]  
FARRELL J, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P107
[5]  
HART O, 1990, BROOKINGS PAP ECO AC, P205
[6]  
ORDOVER JA, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P127
[7]  
PERRY MK, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P219
[8]   LOSSES FROM HORIZONTAL MERGER - THE EFFECTS OF AN EXOGENOUS CHANGE IN INDUSTRY STRUCTURE ON COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIUM [J].
SALANT, SW ;
SWITZER, S ;
REYNOLDS, RJ .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 98 (02) :185-199
[9]   VERTICAL MERGERS AND MARKET FORECLOSURE [J].
SALINGER, MA .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1988, 103 (02) :345-356