SOCIAL-WELFARE FUNCTIONS FOR ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS WITH AND WITHOUT THE PARETO PRINCIPLE

被引：33

作者：

BORDER, KC

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1983年 / 29卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(83)90045-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：205 / 216

页数：12

共 15 条

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