COUNTERVAILING INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS

被引：215

作者：

LEWIS, TR ^{[1
]}

SAPPINGTON, DEM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BELLCORE,MORRISTOWN,NJ 07960

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(89)90083-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：294 / 313

页数：20

共 10 条

[1] Baron D.P., 1984, INFORM EC POLICY, V1, P267
[2] REGULATING A MONOPOLIST WITH UNKNOWN COSTS
BARON, DP
MYERSON, RB
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (04) : 911 - 930
[3] DISSOLVING A PARTNERSHIP EFFICIENTLY
CRAMTON, P
GIBBONS, R
KLEMPERER, P
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (03) : 615 - 632
[4] CRAMTON P, 1986, 27 YALE U SCH MAN WO
[5] FEENSTRA R, 1987, NEGOTIATED TRADE RES
[6] USING COST OBSERVATION TO REGULATE FIRMS
LAFFONT, JJ
TIROLE, J
[J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1986, 94 (03) : 614 - 641
[7] LEWIS T, 1989, AM EC REV, V79
[8] MCAFEE RP, 1987, J ECON LIT, V25, P699
[9] OPTIMAL LABOR CONTRACTS WHEN WORKERS HAVE A VARIETY OF PRIVATELY OBSERVED RESERVATION WAGES
MOORE, J
[J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1985, 52 (01) : 37 - 67
[10] INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM
MYERSON, RB
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (01) : 61 - 73