RULES, DISCRETION AND REPUTATION IN A MODEL OF MONETARY-POLICY

被引:1300
作者
BARRO, RJ
GORDON, DB
机构
[1] NATL BUR ECON RES,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
[2] UNIV ROCHESTER,ROCHESTER,NY 14627
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-X
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:101 / 121
页数:21
相关论文
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