THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT IN THE FISHERY

The common property problem derives from the incompatibility of individual incentives with collective interests. In the fishery this incompatibility results in a greater than optimum stock depletion. The purpose of the present study is to investigate the deterrent effect of regulatory enforcement in the fishery. In particular, estimates of the so-called "supply of offences' are obtained with observations on individual behavior drawn from a random survey of fishermen. The study focuses upon the response of violation rates to changes in different enforcement sanctions. The economic model of criminal behavior is particularly appropriate in the fishery where the gains and losses from illegal catch are primarily monetary. The deterrence estimates obtained in this study employ individual units of observation and are therefore of interest to an audience beyond the fisheries' literature. The next section briefly reviews the relevant debate in the economics of crime literature regarding empirical tests of deterrence. Section III presents the economic theory of participation in illegal activities and casts the model in the present context of the fishery. Section IV describes the survey and discusses some of its features. The data employed in the estimation are discussed in section V, and the econometric results are presented in section VI. Concluding comments are contained in a final section. -from Author