THE THEORETICAL LIMITS TO REDISTRIBUTION

[1] [Anonymous], 1979, AGGREG REVEL PREF

[2] A NOTE ON INCENTIVES IN LARGE ECONOMIES [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1982, 49 (04) : 627 - 635

[3] FAIR ALLOCATIONS IN LARGE ECONOMIES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 25 (02) : 269 - 282

[4] IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) : 185 - 216

[5] INCENTIVES AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1979, 11 (01) : 25 - 45

[6] GUESNERIE R, 1981, TAXATION INCENTIVES

[7] OPTIMUM TAXATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1973, 6 (01) : 96 - 106

[8] ALLOCATIONS ATTAINABLE THROUGH NASH EQUILIBRIA [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1979, 21 (01) : 140 - 165

[9] RULES RATHER THAN DISCRETION - INCONSISTENCY OF OPTIMAL PLANS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1977, 85 (03) : 473 - 491

[10] LAFFONT JJ, 1979, AGGREGATION REVELATI

[1] [Anonymous], 1979, AGGREG REVEL PREF

[2] A NOTE ON INCENTIVES IN LARGE ECONOMIES [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1982, 49 (04) : 627 - 635

[3] FAIR ALLOCATIONS IN LARGE ECONOMIES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 25 (02) : 269 - 282

[4] IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) : 185 - 216

[5] INCENTIVES AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1979, 11 (01) : 25 - 45

[6] GUESNERIE R, 1981, TAXATION INCENTIVES

[7] OPTIMUM TAXATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1973, 6 (01) : 96 - 106

[8] ALLOCATIONS ATTAINABLE THROUGH NASH EQUILIBRIA [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1979, 21 (01) : 140 - 165

[9] RULES RATHER THAN DISCRETION - INCONSISTENCY OF OPTIMAL PLANS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1977, 85 (03) : 473 - 491

[10] LAFFONT JJ, 1979, AGGREGATION REVELATI