AN AXIOMATIZATION OF THE CORE OF COOPERATIVE GAMES WITHOUT SIDE PAYMENTS

被引:81
作者
PELEG, B
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10.1016/0304-4068(85)90020-5
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F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:203 / 214
页数:12
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