AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION OF IPO RETURNS AND SUBSEQUENT EQUITY OFFERINGS

被引:156
作者
JEGADEESH, N
WEINSTEIN, M
WELCH, I
机构
[1] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024
[2] UNIV SO CALIF,LOS ANGELES,CA 90089
关键词
IPO UNDERPRICING; MARKET-FEEDBACK HYPOTHESIS; SEASONED EQUITY OFFERING; SIGNALING HYPOTHESIS;
D O I
10.1016/0304-405X(93)90016-5
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Several recent papers present signaling models in which firms underprice their initial public offerings of equity (IPOs) so that they can subsequently issue scasoned equity at more favorable prices. We test the implications of these models. We find a positive relation between IPO underpricing and the probability and size of subsequent seasoned offerings. Although these results are consistent with the implications of the signaling hypotheses, the economic significance appears weak. We conduct additional tests to evaluate other explanations for these findings and find the alternatives more compelling.
引用
收藏
页码:153 / 175
页数:23
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