共 2 条
[1]
RUBINSTEIN A, 1983, J EC THEORY, V30
[2]
Shavell Steven, 1979, Q J EC
BONUS-MALUS SYSTEM OR PARTIAL COVERAGE TO OPPOSE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEMS
被引：5
作者：
VANDEBROEK, M
机构：
[1] Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Louvain
关键词：
MORAL HAZARD;
PARTIAL COVERAGE;
BONUS-MALUS SYSTEM;
STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING;
D O I：
10.1016/0167-6687(93)90528-W
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The efficiency of bonus-malus systems and partial coverages in preventing moral hazard problems is analyzed by solving a stochastic dynamic programming model. By examining the resulting payoffs of both parties involved it is possible to compare insurance contracts in terms of the level of care they induce. It is shown that the principal reason for taking preventive actions is the partial coverage, the bonus and/or malus involved being far less decisive.
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页码：1 / 5
页数：5
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