A LETTER TO THE EDITOR ON WAGE BARGAINING

被引：103

作者：

HALLER, H ^{[1
]}

HOLDEN, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV OSLO,DEPT ECON,N-0317 OSLO 3,NORWAY

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1990年 / 52卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(90)90077-W

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The Rubinstein perfect information alternating offers bargaining model is problematic when applied to wage negotiations. A strike or any other industrial action is not an automatic consequence of a delay in reaching an agreement, because production can continue normally also when negotiations take place. This paper extends the Rubinstein model to incorporate the choice of calling a strike, and it is shown that in this model there is no longer a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and that strikes with a length in real time can occur in equilibrium. © 1990.

引用

页码：232 / 236

页数：5