PROPERTY TAXATION, NASH EQUILIBRIUM, AND MARKET POWER

被引：106

作者：

HOYT, WH

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, College of Business and Economics, University of Kentucky, Lexington

来源：

JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS | 1991年 / 30卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0094-1190(91)90049-D

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Differences in tax policy arise from differences in the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area. Following Wildasin [4] and Bucovetsky [2] the tax rates in the jurisdictions are determined in a Nash game in the tax rate. The tax rate and public service level as well as the welfare of residents increase as the number of jurisdictions in the metropolis decreases. © 1991.

引用

页码：123 / 131

页数：9

共 7 条

[1] TAX COMPETITION, UNIFORM ASSESSMENT, AND THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE [J].