THE AGENT-AGENTS PROBLEM - PAYMENT BY RELATIVE OUTPUT

被引：49

作者：

CARMICHAEL, HL

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/298004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：50 / 65

页数：16

共 15 条

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