A BOUND ON THE PROPORTION OF PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA IN GENERIC GAMES

被引:30
作者
GUL, F
PEARCE, D
STACCHETTI, E
机构
[1] YALE UNIV,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520
[2] UNIV MICHIGAN,DEPT ECON,ANN ARBOR,MI 48109
关键词
D O I
10.1287/moor.18.3.548
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
In a generic finite normal form game with 2alpha + 1 Nash equilibria, at least alpha of the equilibria are nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria (that is, they involve randomization by some players).
引用
收藏
页码:548 / 552
页数:5
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