CALIBRATION AND PROBABILITY JUDGMENTS - CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

被引:326
作者
KEREN, G [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV UTRECHT,UTRECHT,NETHERLANDS
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0001-6918(91)90036-Y
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
In a world characterized by uncertainty, the study of how people assess probabilities carries both theoretical and practical implications. Much of the research efforts in this area, especially in psychology, has focused on calibration studies (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips 1982). The present article offers an extensive review of conceptual and methodological issues involved in the study of calibration and probability assessments. It is claimed that most calibration studies have focused on technical formal issues and are in this respect a-theoretical. The reason for this state of affairs is the adoption of a strict perspective which assumes that uncertainty is a reflection of the external world, and relies heavily on normative and formal considerations. Several unresolved problems within this strict outlook are pointed out. The present paper assumes that calibration (and assessments of subjective probabilities in general) is not a characteristic of the event(s), but rather of the assessor (Lad 1984), and advocates a more loose perspective, which is broader and more descriptive in nature. Possible discrepancies between a strict and a more loose perspective, as well as reconciliation attempts, are presented. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码:217 / 273
页数:57
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