Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms

被引:30
作者
Ding, Rong [1 ]
Hou, Wenxuan [2 ]
Kuo, Jing-Ming [3 ]
Lee, Edward [4 ]
机构
[1] Middlesex Univ, Business Sch, London NW4 4BT, England
[2] Univ Edinburgh, Business Sch, Edinburgh EH8 9JS, Midlothian, Scotland
[3] Univ Durham, Ushaw Coll, Business Sch, Durham DH7 9RH, England
[4] Manchester Business Sch, Crawford House,Oxford Rd, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
关键词
Share price informativeness; Mutual funds; State ownership; Ownership structure; China;
D O I
10.1016/j.mulfin.2013.03.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. Existing evidence shows that stock price informativeness is low in China, and attributes this to firms' lack of disclosure incentives under the weak investor protection institutional environment. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors to monitor firms, and thus serve as an external governance mechanism to improve corporate transparency. However, the impact of mutual funds in China can also be moderated by state ownership of listed firms, which reduces firms' dependence on outside investors for capital. Indeed, we find that mutual fund ownership is positively related to share price informativeness, but this effect is less pronounced among statecontrolled firms. The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual funds contribute to the corporate information environment of emerging economies but further privatization of listed firms would be needed to realize greater benefit. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:166 / 185
页数:20
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