SINGULARITY THEORY AND CORE EXISTENCE IN THE SPATIAL MODEL

被引:26
作者
BANKS, JS [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV ROCHESTER,DEPT POLIT SCI,ROCHESTER,NY 14627
关键词
CORE; VOTING GAME; SINGULARITIES; TRANSVERSALITY;
D O I
10.1016/0304-4068(94)00704-E
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
When the dimension of the outcome space in a voting game is sufficiently high, a core outcome will fail to exist for almost all utility profiles. Previous work by Schofield and McKelvey has identified critical dimensions for this generic non-existence, employing results on singularities of mappings and transversal intersections. In this paper we demonstrate that their proofs are incorrect, and determine the right dimensions implied by their singularity approach.
引用
收藏
页码:523 / 536
页数:14
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