CONTINUOUS APPROXIMATION OF DYNAMICAL-SYSTEMS WITH RANDOMLY MATCHED INDIVIDUALS

被引:27
作者
BOYLAN, RT
机构
[1] Washington University, Olin School of Business, St. Louis
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1995.1060
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Biologists and economists have analyzed populations in which each individual interacts with randomly selected individuals. Because random matching generates a very complicated stochastic process, biologists and economists frequently approximate the population dynamics by a deterministic process. This paper examines the limit of random matching schemes as the population grows, matches occur very frequently, and the proportion of the population paired in a matching becomes very small. In the limit, the population evolves according to a differential equation. The proof of convergence depends either on the existence of a global attractor or on finiteness of the time horizon. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:615 / 625
页数:11
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