MANIPULATING LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM VIA ENDOWMENTS

被引：12

作者：

SERTEL, MR

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Boǧaziçi University, 80815 Bebek, Istanbul

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1994年 / 46卷 / 02期

关键词：

LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM; MANIPULATION; ENDOWMENTS; DONATIONS;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(94)90012-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Simple examples of two- and three-person economies with a single private and a single public good are presented to show that the Lindahl equilibrium is individually manipulable, by donation, by destruction and by hiding of one's endowment, as well as coalitionally manipulable by intra-coalitional reallocation of endowments.

引用

页码：167 / 171

页数：5