A THEORY OF DISAGREEMENT IN BARGAINING

[1] ASHENFELTER O, 1969, AM ECON REV, V59, P35

[2] CHATTERJEE K, 1981, 281 BOST U SCH MAN W

[3] CRAWFORD VP, UNPUB ECONOMETRICA

[4] Cross John G., 1969, EC BARGAINING

[5] DASGUPTA P, 1977, IMSSS252 STANF TECHN

[6] ELLSBERG D, 1975, BARGAINING FORMAL TH

[7] Harsanyi J.C., 1961, J CONFLICT RESOLUT, V5, P179

[8] HARSANYI JC, 1972, MANAGE SCI B-APPL, V18, pP80

[9] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) : 320 - 334

[10] HARSANYI JC, 1977, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR BA

[1] ASHENFELTER O, 1969, AM ECON REV, V59, P35

[2] CHATTERJEE K, 1981, 281 BOST U SCH MAN W

[3] CRAWFORD VP, UNPUB ECONOMETRICA

[4] Cross John G., 1969, EC BARGAINING

[5] DASGUPTA P, 1977, IMSSS252 STANF TECHN

[6] ELLSBERG D, 1975, BARGAINING FORMAL TH

[7] Harsanyi J.C., 1961, J CONFLICT RESOLUT, V5, P179

[8] HARSANYI JC, 1972, MANAGE SCI B-APPL, V18, pP80

[9] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) : 320 - 334

[10] HARSANYI JC, 1977, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR BA