DEMOCRACY AND THE PERSONAL VOTE - A CAUTIONARY TALE FROM JAPAN

被引:23
作者
REED, SR
机构
[1] Faculty of Policy Studies, Chuo University, Tokyo
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0261-3794(94)90004-3
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The debate on the merits of various electoral systems focuses primarily, and properly, on the relationship between a party's percentage of the vote and its percentage of the seats. The choice between proportional systems and systems that purposefully reduce the number of parties mirror two basically different theories of democracy: the consensus and the majoritarian. However, a second dimension needs also to be considered-the degree to which the electoral system produces incentives to create candidate, as opposed to party, support. Japan presents us with an electoral system that is medium' on the consensus versus majoritarian dimension, but produces extremely strong incentives for candidates to rely on their personal vote. Both dimensions have serious implications for the quality of democracy.
引用
收藏
页码:17 / 28
页数:12
相关论文
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