CONDORCET PRINCIPLE IMPLIES THE NO SHOW PARADOX

被引：119

作者：

MOULIN, H

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(88)90253-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：53 / 64

页数：12

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