EXISTENCE OF A LOCAL CO-OPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN A CLASS OF VOTING GAMES

被引:30
作者
KRAMER, GH [1 ]
KLEVORIC.AK [1 ]
机构
[1] YALE UNIV,COWLES FDN,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2296704
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
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页码:539 / 547
页数:9
相关论文
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