BACKWARD INDUCTION AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF RATIONALITY

被引：247

作者：

AUMANN, RJ

机构：

[1] Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1995年 / 8卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80015-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We formulate precisely and prove the proposition that if common knowledge of rationality obtains in a game of perfect information, then the backward induction outcome is reached. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：6 / 19

页数：14

共 22 条

[1] CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM AS AN EXPRESSION OF BAYESIAN RATIONALITY [J].

AUMANN, RJ .

ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (01) :1-18

[2]

AUMANN RJ, 1995, IN PRESS ECONOMETRIC

[3]

Aumann RJ, 1992, EC ANAL MARKETS GAME, P214

[4] ON THE NONEXISTENCE OF A RATIONALITY DEFINITION FOR EXTENSIVE GAMES [J].

BASU, K .

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 1990, 19 (01) :33-44

[5]

BENPORTH E, 1992, 1492 TEL AV U SACKL

[6]

BICCHIERI C, 1989, ERKENNTNIS, V30, P69

[7]

BICCHIERI C, 1993, CMUPHIL37 C MELL U R

[8]

Bicchieri Cristina, 1992, KNOWLEDGE BELIEF STR

[9] MODELING RATIONAL PLAYERS .1. [J].

BINMORE, K .

ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY, 1987, 3 (02) :179-214

[10] THE LOGIC OF RATIONAL PLAY IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION [J].

BONANNO, G .

ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY, 1991, 7 (01) :37-65

← 1 2 3 →