CEO COMPENSATION MONITORING AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

被引：15

作者：

TOSI, HL ^{[1
]}

GOMEZMEJIA, LR ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] ARIZONA STATE UNIV,COLL BUSINESS,TEMPE,AZ 85287

来源：

ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 1994年 / 37卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/256609

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study used a behavioral scale assessing the monitoring of the compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) to test two hypotheses derived from agency theory and the corporate governance literature. Results were consistent with the hypotheses, showing that CEO compensation monitoring is related asymptotically to firm performance and that the relationship between monitoring and performance is stronger in management-controlled firms than in owner-controlled firms.

引用

页码：1002 / 1016

页数：15

共 23 条

[1] THE COMPOSITION OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND STRATEGIC CONTROL - EFFECTS ON CORPORATE-STRATEGY [J].