SOME TESTS OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PRIVATE SELF AND THE COLLECTIVE SELF

On the bases of Greenwald and Pratkanis's (1984) distinction between private and collective aspects of the self and on Triandis's (1989) theory about individualistic and collectivistic cultures, 2 competing theories concerning the organization of self-cognitions were proposed. Findings from 2 experiments supported the notion that private and collective self-cognitions are stored in separate locations in memory. First, Ss from individualistic cultures retrieved more cognitions about the private self, and fewer about the collective self, than Ss from collectivistic cultures. Second, priming a particular aspect of the self increased the retrieval of self-cognitions pertaining to that aspect of the self. Finally, the probability of retrieving a self-cognition was greater if the same type of self-cognition had been previously retrieved than if a different type had been previously retrieved.