PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, PRIVATE INFORMATION COLLECTION, AND SHORT-TERM TRADING

被引：111

作者：

MCNICHOLS, M ^{[1
]}

TRUEMAN, B ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,BERKELEY,CA 94720

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 1994年 / 17卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4101(94)90005-1

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper examines how public disclosure affects private information acquisition activity in a market economy. We analyze a setting where traders with short-term investment horizon, are allowed to trade on their private information prior to a public disclosure. We demonstrate in this setting that public disclosure stimulates investment in private information acquisition. This result is shown to have implications for the magnitude of the pre-announcement and announcement price reactions to the disclosure.

引用

页码：69 / 94

页数：26

共 20 条

[1]

ALLES M, 1990, 1090 STANF U RES PAP

[2]

BEAVER WH, 1977, REPORT ADVISORY COMM

[3] PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION MARKETS [J].