CREATING A GOOD ATMOSPHERE - MINIMUM PARTICIPATION FOR TACKLING THE GREENHOUSE-EFFECT

被引:46
作者
BLACK, J [1 ]
LEVI, MD [1 ]
DEMEZA, D [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV BRITISH COLUMBIA,VANCOUVER V6T 1W5,BC,CANADA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2554852
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper explores the implications of setting a minimum ratification level on an international agreement to tackle the Greenhouse Effect. Several aspects of the ratification level are considered, including the threshold number of signatories required to effect agreement, the potential number of participating countries, and the distribution of benefits from taking action. The likelihood of reaching agreement on a ratification level is also considered. It is shown, for example, that the optimal ratification level is reasonably robust to variations in circumstances, and that the prospects for effecting a treaty may be improved by there being a large number of countries.
引用
收藏
页码:281 / 293
页数:13
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