ON THE BEHAVIOR OF SEPARATING EQUILIBRIA OF SIGNALING GAMES WITH A FINITE-SET OF TYPES AS THE SET OF TYPES BECOMES DENSE IN AN INTERVAL

被引：3

作者：

MAILATH, GJ

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(88)90012-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：413 / 424

页数：12

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[7]

Spence A. M., 1974, J ECON THEORY, V7, P296

[8] JOB MARKET SIGNALING [J].

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