BARGAINING SET-THEORY AND STABILITY IN COALITION GOVERNMENTS

被引：12

作者：

SCHOFIELD, N

机构：

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 1982年 / 3卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4896(82)90003-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：9 / 31

页数：23

共 43 条

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