TESTING MODELS OF NONKIN COOPERATION - MUTUALISM AND THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA

被引:120
作者
CLEMENTS, KC
STEPHENS, DW
机构
[1] Nebraska Behavioral Biology Group, School of Biological Sciences, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1006/anbe.1995.0267
中图分类号
B84 [心理学]; C [社会科学总论]; Q98 [人类学];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ; 030303 ; 04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Since 1981, the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has dominated studies of non-kin cooperation. Alternative models have received relatively little attention. The simplest alternative is mutualism, in which mutual cooperation always pays best. The behaviour of three pairs of blue jays, Cyanocitta cristata, was tested in precisely controlled iterated mutualism and Prisoner's Dilemma games. Although the jays readily cooperated in the mutualism game, cooperation neither developed nor persisted in a Prisoner's Dilemma. No empirical justification was found for the status of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma as the basic paradigm of non-kin cooperation. (C) 1995 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour
引用
收藏
页码:527 / 535
页数:9
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