AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM

被引：1239

作者：

GROSSMAN, SJ ^{[1
]}

HART, OD ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV LONDON LONDON SCH ECON & POLIT SCI,LONDON WC2A 2AE,ENGLAND

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912246

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：7 / 45

页数：39

共 24 条

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