LONG-TERM-CONTRACTS AND MORAL HAZARD

[1] Fama Eugene, 1980, J POLITICAL EC APR, P288

[2] GROSSMAN S, 1983, ECONOMETRICA JAN, P7

[3] HARRIS M, 1978, AM EC REV MAR, P20

[4] HARRIS M, 1979, J ECON THEORY, P231

[5] HARRIS M, 1982, REV EC STUDIES, P315

[6] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[7] LAMBERT R, 1981, THESIS STANFORD U

[8] MILGROM PR, 1981, BELL J ECON, P380

[9] Mirrlees J., 1974, ESSAYS EC BEHAV UNCE, P243

[10] OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF INCENTIVES AND AUTHORITY WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1976, 7 (01): : 105 - 131

[1] Fama Eugene, 1980, J POLITICAL EC APR, P288

[2] GROSSMAN S, 1983, ECONOMETRICA JAN, P7

[3] HARRIS M, 1978, AM EC REV MAR, P20

[4] HARRIS M, 1979, J ECON THEORY, P231

[5] HARRIS M, 1982, REV EC STUDIES, P315

[6] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[7] LAMBERT R, 1981, THESIS STANFORD U

[8] MILGROM PR, 1981, BELL J ECON, P380

[9] Mirrlees J., 1974, ESSAYS EC BEHAV UNCE, P243

[10] OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF INCENTIVES AND AUTHORITY WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1976, 7 (01): : 105 - 131