AGENCY THEORY, MANAGERIAL WELFARE, AND TAKEOVER BID RESISTANCE

被引：158

作者：

WALKLING, RA ^{[1
]}

LONG, MS ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ILLINOIS,CHICAGO,IL 60680

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1984年 / 15卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/3003669

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：54 / 68

页数：15

共 21 条

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