POSTULATES AND PARADOXES OF RELATIVE VOTING POWER - A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL

This paper re-evaluates the problem of measuring the a priori relative voting power of a voter in an assembly. We propose several new intuitively compelling postulates that any reasonable index of voting power ought to satisfy. At the same time we argue that most of the paradoxes of voting power discussed in the literature are paradoxical only in a weak sense, if at all. This Leaves three crippling paradoxes - the well-known paradox of weighted voting, and two new ones presented here: the bloc and donation paradoxes. We evaluate the four main relative power indices discussed in the literature with respect to these three severe paradoxes. The Shapley-Shubik index is seen to be immune to all three paradoxes, while the Deegan-Packel index is vulnerable to all three. The Banzhaf and the Johnston indices are demonstrably immune to the paradox of weighted voting. However, they are shown to suffer from both the bloc and the donation paradoxes. We argue that this seriously undermines these indices in a hitherto unsuspected way. Several other theoretical issues relating to voting power are discussed.