EVIDENCE THAT PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE SAME AS ACCESS CONSCIOUSNESS

被引：8

作者：

BAARS, BJ

机构：

[1] The Wright Institute, Berkeley

来源：

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES | 1995年 / 18卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1017/S0140525X00038218

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

Block seems to propose untested answers to empirical questions. Whether consciousness is a ''mongrel problem,'' rather than a single core fact with many facets, is an empirical issue. Likewise, the intimate relationship between personal consciousness and global access functions cannot be decided pretheoretically. This point is demonstrated by the reader's private experience of foveal versus parafoveal vision, and for conscious versus unconscious representation of the many meanings of common words.

引用

页码：249 / 249

页数：1