MARKET POWER AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ASYMMETRY OF THE POSTED OFFER TRADING INSTITUTION

被引：5

作者：

DAVIS, DD

WILLIAMS, AW

机构：

[1] VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIV, RICHMOND, VA 23284 USA

[2] INDIANA UNIV, BLOOMINGTON, IN 47405 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1990年 / 34卷 / 03期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(90)90118-K

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper reports a series of market experiments examining the conjecture that the institutional asymmetry inherent in posted-offer pricing can suppress the exercise of market power by the non-posting side of the market. The data clearly support this conjecture if market power is defined as a unilateral incentive to manipulate the market price via strategic quantity withholding. © 1990.

引用

页码：211 / 214

页数：4