INNOVATION AND THE PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY

被引：4

作者：

LIPPMAN, SA

MAMER, JW

机构：

[1] Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1992年 / 38卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(92)90166-V

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The auction framework enables us to highlight a crucial feature of many R&D races: the losing firm can recoup part but not the entirety of its R&D investment. This feature is shown to account for the marked differences in results obtained by Gilbert and Newbery and by Reinganum. When the firm investing the largest amount wins with certainty, we establish the existence of a unique equilibrium: neither firm employs a pure strategy and the incumbent wins more often than the challenger.

引用

页码：83 / 91

页数：9