STABILITY AND POLARIZATION OF INTERESTS IN JOB MATCHING

[1] BERGSTROM T, 1982, CAN COURTSHIP CHEATP

[2] JOB MATCHING WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND WORKERS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (02) : 437 - 450

[3] Demange Gabrielle., 1982, Strategyproofness in the assignment market game

[4] MACHIAVELLI AND THE GALE-SHAPLEY ALGORITHM [J]. AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1981, 88 (07) : 485 - 494

[5] COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND STABILITY OF MARRIAGE [J]. AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1962, 69 (01) : 9 - &

[6] JONES PC, 1982, POLYNOMIAL TIME MARK

[7] JOB MATCHING, COALITION-FORMATION, AND GROSS SUBSTITUTES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (06) : 1483 - 1504

[8] Knuth D, 1976, MARRIAGES STABLES

[9] QUINZII M, 1982, CORE COMPETITIVE EQU

[10] RITZ Z, 1982, INCENTIVES STABILITY

[1] BERGSTROM T, 1982, CAN COURTSHIP CHEATP

[2] JOB MATCHING WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND WORKERS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (02) : 437 - 450

[3] Demange Gabrielle., 1982, Strategyproofness in the assignment market game

[4] MACHIAVELLI AND THE GALE-SHAPLEY ALGORITHM [J]. AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1981, 88 (07) : 485 - 494

[5] COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND STABILITY OF MARRIAGE [J]. AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1962, 69 (01) : 9 - &

[6] JONES PC, 1982, POLYNOMIAL TIME MARK

[7] JOB MATCHING, COALITION-FORMATION, AND GROSS SUBSTITUTES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (06) : 1483 - 1504

[8] Knuth D, 1976, MARRIAGES STABLES

[9] QUINZII M, 1982, CORE COMPETITIVE EQU

[10] RITZ Z, 1982, INCENTIVES STABILITY