GAPS IN HARLEY ARGUMENT ON EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE LEARNING RULES AND IN THE LOGIC OF TIT FOR TAT

被引:56
作者
SELTEN, R
HAMMERSTEIN, P
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D O I
10.1017/S0140525X00026479
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B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
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页码:115 / 116
页数:2
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