INTEREST ARBITRATION, OUTCOMES, AND THE INCENTIVE TO BARGAIN

[1] A DIFFICULTY IN THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL WELFARE [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1950, 58 (04) : 328 - 346

[2] Atherton W.N., 1973, THEORY UNION BARGAIN

[3] FARBER HS, 1978, J POLIT ECON, V86, P923, DOI 10.1086/260718

[4] FARBER HS, 1979, 242 MIT DEP EC WORK

[5] FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION AND CHILLING EFFECT [J]. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1975, 14 (03): : 302 - 310

[6] HICKS JR, 1963, THEORY WAGES, P146

[7] LIPSKY DB, 1977, J COLLECT NEG PUB SE, V6, P229

[8] Luce D, 1957, GAMES DECISIONS

[9] MARCH JG, 1959, ORGANIZATIONS, P136

[10] STERN JL, 1975, FINAL OFFER ARBITRAT

[1] A DIFFICULTY IN THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL WELFARE [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1950, 58 (04) : 328 - 346

[2] Atherton W.N., 1973, THEORY UNION BARGAIN

[3] FARBER HS, 1978, J POLIT ECON, V86, P923, DOI 10.1086/260718

[4] FARBER HS, 1979, 242 MIT DEP EC WORK

[5] FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION AND CHILLING EFFECT [J]. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1975, 14 (03): : 302 - 310

[6] HICKS JR, 1963, THEORY WAGES, P146

[7] LIPSKY DB, 1977, J COLLECT NEG PUB SE, V6, P229

[8] Luce D, 1957, GAMES DECISIONS

[9] MARCH JG, 1959, ORGANIZATIONS, P136

[10] STERN JL, 1975, FINAL OFFER ARBITRAT