Additional Aspects of the Stackelberg Strategy in Nonzero-Sum Games

被引：166

作者：

Simaan, M. ^{[1
,2
]}

Cruz, J. B., Jr. ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Illinois, Coordinated Sci Lab, Urbana, IL 61801 USA

[2] Univ Illinois, Dept Elect Engn, Urbana, IL 61801 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS | 1973年 / 11卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00935561

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

The Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games is a reasonable solution concept for games where, either due to lack of information on the part of one player about the performance function of the other, or due to different speeds in computing the strategies, or due to differences in size or strength, one player dominates the entire game by imposing a solution which is favorable to himself. This paper discusses some properties of this solution concept when the players use controls that are functions of the state variables of the game in addition to time. The difficulties in determining such controls are also pointed out. A simple two-stage finite state discrete game is used to illustrate these properties.

引用

页码：613 / 626

页数：14