TAX EVASION AND OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAXATION

被引:78
作者
CREMER, H
GAHVARI, F
机构
[1] Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, State University, Blacksburg
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90052-U
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper incorporates tax evasion into Ramsey's optimal taxation problem. It provides (i) a precise and intuitive characterization of the tradeoff between optimal tax rates and audit probabilities, and (ii) a modified version of the 'Ramsey equation'. It also proves that in the presence of tax evasion: (a) the well-known requirement of 'proportional reduction in compensated demands', (b) the traditional result on the optimality of uniform taxation when income is exogenous, and (c) the equivalence of wage and uniform commodity taxes are no longer valid.
引用
收藏
页码:261 / 275
页数:15
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