COLLUSIVE BIDDING IN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS

被引：5

作者：

Mcafee, R. Preston ^{[1
]}

Vincent, Daniel ^{[2
]}

Williams, Michael A. ^{[3
]}

Havens, Melanie Williams ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas Austin, Austin, TX 78712 USA

[2] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

[3] Anal Grp lnc, Los Angeles, CA 90017 USA

[4] Calif State Univ Northridge, Sch Business Adm & Econ, Northridge, CA 91330 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 1993年 / 2卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1430-9134.1993.00449.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Bidders in hostile takeovers have colluded in five separate instances. It is found that these collusive agreements did not affect the target's price significantly. A model is developed to explain this observation. A welfare analysis indicates that a positive probability of cartel formation can be socially beneficial and may or may not be beneficial to the target's shareholders, depending on the process generating takeover attempts. This sheds light on the existing policy debate concerning regulations of collusive agreements. An analysis of the existing case law is provided, which indicates that such collusive arrangements are legal at present.

引用

页码：449 / 482

页数：34

共 7 条

[1] INTERFIRM TENDER OFFERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE-CONTROL [J].