POLITICIANS, BUREAUCRATS, AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

被引:82
作者
BENDOR, J [1 ]
TAYLOR, S [1 ]
VANGAALEN, R [1 ]
机构
[1] CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV,PITTSBURGH,PA 15213
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2111225
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:796 / 828
页数:33
相关论文
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