WORKERS TRUST FUNDS AND THE LOGIC OF WAGE PROFILES

[1] AKERLOF GA, 1987, 1325 HARV I EC RES W

[2] LAW ENFORCEMENT, MALFEASANCE, AND COMPENSATION OF ENFORCERS [J]. JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1974, 3 (01) : 1 - 18

[3] BOWLES S, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P16

[4] A THEORY OF DUAL LABOR-MARKETS WITH APPLICATION TO INDUSTRIAL-POLICY, DISCRIMINATION, AND KEYNESIAN UNEMPLOYMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1986, 4 (03) : 376 - 414

[5] CALVO G, 1985, Q J ECON, P373

[6] CARMICHAEL L, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P1213

[7] DICKENS WT, 1987, NBER2356 WORK PAP

[8] EATON C, 1983, ECONOMICA MAY, P175

[9] DELAYED PAYMENT CONTRACTS AND A FIRMS PROPENSITY TO HIRE OLDER WORKERS [J]. JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1986, 4 (04) : 439 - 457

[10] KATZ LF, 1986, NBER MACROECON ANNU, P235

[1] AKERLOF GA, 1987, 1325 HARV I EC RES W

[2] LAW ENFORCEMENT, MALFEASANCE, AND COMPENSATION OF ENFORCERS [J]. JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1974, 3 (01) : 1 - 18

[3] BOWLES S, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P16

[4] A THEORY OF DUAL LABOR-MARKETS WITH APPLICATION TO INDUSTRIAL-POLICY, DISCRIMINATION, AND KEYNESIAN UNEMPLOYMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1986, 4 (03) : 376 - 414

[5] CALVO G, 1985, Q J ECON, P373

[6] CARMICHAEL L, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P1213

[7] DICKENS WT, 1987, NBER2356 WORK PAP

[8] EATON C, 1983, ECONOMICA MAY, P175

[9] DELAYED PAYMENT CONTRACTS AND A FIRMS PROPENSITY TO HIRE OLDER WORKERS [J]. JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1986, 4 (04) : 439 - 457

[10] KATZ LF, 1986, NBER MACROECON ANNU, P235