DOMINO DUMPING .2. ANTIDUMPING

被引：22

作者：

ANDERSON, JE

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill

来源：

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 1993年 / 35卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-1996(93)90008-L

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Domino dumping [Anderson (American Economic Review, 1992, 82, 65-83)] arises when exporting firms dump to obtain more export licenses in the future when there is a positive probability of a future VER. Anti-dumping policy may then be in the public interest for the importing country, via lowering the probability of a VER. Increased enforcement may perversely lead to a rise in dumping. Also it may increase the probability of a VER and may reduce the probability of free trade. It is possible for the public interest to require some enforcement. However, it is normally in the public interest to permit some dumping.

引用

页码：133 / 150

页数：18

共 8 条

[1]

ANDERSON JE, 1992, AM ECON REV, V82, P65

[2]

Baldwin R.E., 1985, POLITICAL EC US IMPO

[3]

Dixit AvinashVictor Norman., 1980, Theory of International Trade: A Dual, General Equilibrium Approach

[4]

Ethier W., 1988, Modern International Economics