ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC-SERVICES - EXIT, VOICE AND CONTROL

被引:91
作者
PAUL, S
机构
[1] The World Bank, Washington, DC
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0305-750X(92)90130-N
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This paper argues that the positive impact of public accountability on public service performance and governance in general can be augmented by moving away from an exclusive reliance on control mechanisms such as hierarchical monitoring and use of organizational incentives to a system that uses "exit" or "voice" mechanisms in conjunction with control. Whether the public will resort to exit or voice will depend on the relative costs associated with these options and the expected value to them of the performance improvement resulting from their use in a specific context. Public services can be categorized in terms of the exit and voice potential they afford the public by reference to certain barriers and characteristics. The paper provides a framework for the analysis of the features and barriers of public services and of the publics involved that can be used to predict the potential for the use of exit and voice in specific service contexts. A menu of options for improving public accountability through the use of exit and voice mechanisms and their policy implications are also presented.
引用
收藏
页码:1047 / 1060
页数:14
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